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For Your Thought
After two years in the position of Editor I am
delighted to report that the Colonial Lawyer will be
receiving a transfusion of new blood when Charles
Poston assumes the helm. I had desired to leave
Colonial Lawyer on a high key and this issue has
satisfied all the requirements.
During the past two years I have become deeply
concerned over environmental problems and by
using Virginia as a reference point, I have tried to
comprehend all of the issues involved and be able to
offer a positive solution. After a period of time, I
faced the realization that the common denominator
which existed for most of the non-technological
problems was intelligent land use planning. Whether
the problem was overcrowding, autos, oil refineries,
second home development or airport location, land
use planning offered the optium solution.
The issue of the Colonial Lawyer contains four articles that address themselves to various aspects of
this area. Professor Donaldson questions the continued usefulness of Euclid zoning in our fast

News
N.Y. Lawyer
The Marshall-Wythe School of Law
honored Whitney North Seymour of New
York, a post president of the American
Bar Association, at its annual low review
banquet Saturday at the Williamsburg
Lodge.
Mr. Seymour received the MarshallWythe Medallion which was commissioned in 1966 for presentation by the
School of Law to leaders of the legal
profession in the United States and
abroad.
Mr. Seymour, senior partner of the
New York law firm of Simpson, Thatcher
and Bartlett, was president of the
American Bar Foundation from 1960-64 ;
presidntofhAmcaClegof
Trial Lawyers, 1963-64 ; president of the
Institute of Judicial Administration, 196869; and president and chairman of the
American Arbitration Association, 195355 and again from 1955-57. He was
president of the American Bar
Association from 1960-61.

changing society. Jim Murray's article was part of
the winning essay of the Environmental Law Essay
Contest here at Marshall-Wythe. He gives a solid
case for state level land use planning and suggest
other possible approaches to the problem.
With many expanding zoning concepts, the two
areas which deserve special attention are aesthetic
zoning and the use or abuse of subdivision ordinances. Everett Priestley, photographer turned
writer, shows the agonizing development of
aesthetics as a basis for action and explains some of
the problems that will have to be faced before there
is any furthur development in this area. Leslie Hoffman, who will be Departments Editor for the
Colonial Lawyer next year, has written a
provocative article on the abuse of subdivision ordinances. What demands may a municipality make
on the subdivider before they become an unconstitutional taking of the developer's land?
Each one of these articles contains the ingredients
for a revolution in the American concepts of an individual's property rights and of the scope of a
state's police power. This is an area that cries out
for change. I submit that the legal profession should
take lead in the discussion and this issue of the
Colonial Lawyer con be the first step in that direction. §

NEW FACULTY

MOOT COURT TOURNAMENT

Marshall-Wythe will attain another
first with the arrival of one of three new
professors expected next September. Dr.
Erma M. Lang, A.B. Ohio State ; M.A.,
Ph.D. Harvard; J.D. Georgetown, will be
the first woman law professor to teach at
William and Mary. Dr. Lang will come to
us directly from the University of
Mississippi School of Law. She is a member of the District of Columbia, Nevada,
and Massachussetts Bars and has practiced law in both Boston and Lake Tahoe,
Nevado. She hos also served os a foreign
service officer, working as an economic
analyst in Paris, Vienna and Washington.
The other new faculty members will be
Messieurs Douglas Rendleman and Elmer
J. Schaefer. Mr. Rendleman received his
B.A., M.A. and J.D. at the University of
Iowa and his LL.M. at the University of
Michigan. He was a law clerk for an
Iowa Supreme Court Justice for a year
and has been on the faculty of the
University of Alabama Law School since

Six
schools
participated
in
the
prestigious Annual William and Mary Invitational Moot Court Competition on
Saturday, April 14. Hosted by the Marshall-Wythe team were teams from the
University of Maryland, University of
Virginia, University of North Carolina,
Duke University and defending National
Moot Court Team Champion Georgetown
University. Oral arguments contested the
constitutionality of the "bombshell
charge" to juries during criminal trials,
i.e. the charge to a deadlocked jury that
they must soon come to a decision.
Georgetown won first place for their
argumentative excellence, while Duke
placed second. Heading the list of seven
prominent judges for the competition was

1970.
Mr. Schaefer received his A.B. at Northwestern University and his M.A. and
J.D. at Harvard. He has been with the
Chicago law firm of Jenner and Block
since 1969.

former Supreme Court Justice Tom C.
Clark,

STATUS REPORT
Three hundred twenty graduates had
pledged $22,350 to the Marshall-Wythe
School of Law Fund as of May 1 toward
the $25,000 matching challenge offered
by the College's Board of Visitors.
According to the terms of the Board's
challenge, a sum of $25,000 will be

(Continued on page 20)
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A REASSESSMENT OF THE
LEGAL BASES OF ZONING
— John E. Donaldson

The legal and conceptual premises underlying the
land use planning and control enabling legislation
contained in most of the state statutory codes in this
country impose serious constraints on the formulation and implementation of effective land use
plans and policies. The majority of such legislation
is based upon the Standard Zoning Enabling Act,
published by the United States Department of Commerce in 1926, and the Standard City Planning
Enabling Act published by the same agency in 1928.
These models, and the state enactments they
spawned, reflect the trends, attitudes, values and
planning notions of an era that has passed, and
their utility in the field of land use planning is
diminished by the present state of the art.
A well formulated and implemented land use plan
requires a knowledge of what the community is, an
understanding of what it wishes to-become, an appreciation of the forces which may be present in the
immediate and distant future, and a familiarity with
the range of options and techniques for encouragement and control of development. It requires
the skills of the engineer, attorney, statistician,
demographer, economist and political scientist, as
well as the synthesis and coordination of the
professional planner. It also requires a legal
framework and climate appreciative of its role and
conducive to the realization of its objectives. It is the

John E. Donaldson earned his J.D. degree
at William and Mary and an LL.M. at
Georgetown and is now a Professor of Law at

adequacy of this framework and climate which I will
explore.
Just as water can rise no higher than its source,
the limits of the effectiveness of a regulatory system
are defined by the range of choices and methods
permitted by its legal foundations. When our system
of employer-employee relations was premised upon
stringent adherence of the principle of "freedom of
contract" and abhorrence of "conspiracies in
restraint of trade", its effectiveness was defined
within a context of prevalence of "yellow dog" contracts and suppression of strikes. Because the system
produced or afforded too great an advantage to the
employer and placed the employee in too weak a
bargaining position, the fundamental legal premises
upon which the system was based had to be
changed. It wasn't that the system was inherently
wrong. It was merely unresponsive to the problems
generated by the industrial revolution.

If the legal and conceptual premises underlying
land use planning and control enabling legislation
unduly limit or fail to afford the range of techniques
and controls required for the formulation and implementation of effective land use policies, they
should be carefully examined and appropriately
modified. I believe the time for examination and
alteration is at hand.
The first such premise to be examined is the
assumption that Euclidian zoning is the model to be
formed and implemented in the particular community. The term "Euclidian zoning" is derived from
the case, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U. S. 365 (1926), and its notion is expressed in
Section 2 of the Standard Zoning Enableing Act,
which states:
Sec. 2. Districts— For any or all of said purposes the

Marshall-Wythe. He is also presently serving

local legislative body may divide the municipality into

as a member of the. Board of Supervisors of

districts of such number, shape and area as may be
deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of this
act; and within such districts it may regulate and

James City County, Virginia.

alteration, repair, or use of buildings, structures, or

restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction,
land. All such regulations shall be uniform for each
class or kind of building throughout each district, but
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the regulations in one district may differ from those in
other districts.

On the assu mption that qualitatively different land
uses are incompatible, Euclidian zoning defines a
well planned community in terms of a map whereon
is drawn geometric patterns or districts to which
qualitatively similar land use authorizations are
assigned with the effect of separating "higher uses"
from "lower uses". Thus, in a typical case, single
family dwelling districts utilizing large lots are
isolated from the intrusion of dwellings on smaller
lots which are separately districted. Both are protected from the intrusion of higher density residential
land uses, and these, as the ever expanding protected class, are protected from the respective intrusions of commercial, light industrial, and heavy
industrial uses. Further within each of the districts
employed, regulations are uniform as to like
buildings permitted therein.
Euclidian zoning, in short, emphasizes the mutual
repugnance of qualitatively different land uses and
invites classification and districting along economic,
aesthetic and functional lines with little regard to the
interdependence of the activities permitted within the
dynamic urban system. The Euclidian system, emphasizing the isolation of commercial and industrial
activities and encouraging the segregation of
"higher" residential uses from "lower" or more intense residential uses, is a major contributor to the
problem of urban sprawl and to the boring symmetry of housing developments laid out in ticky-tac
patterns characterized by block after block of
houses on 12,000 square ft. lots set back 35 ft. from
the road, having side yards of 20 ft. and each
costing $23,000. That the separation of "higher"
residential uses from "lower" residential uses contributes to racial segregation of housing within a
given community is self-evident.

The orientation of enabling legislation to the
model of Euclidian zoning has caused the development of a number of doctrines inimical to the formulation and implementation of effective land use
policies, chief among which are the following:
1. Uniformity of regulations pertaining to lot size,
set-back, side yards, etc. as they relate to similar
structures is essential. Development is to occur in accordance with a preconceived, static objective and a
readily measurable spatial standard .of what is
tolerable for particular kinds of structures. Variances
from the standard are not to be permitted merely
because the variance is compatible; a variance is to
be allowed only if there is undue hardship in complia nce.
2. Non-conforming uses by definition are bad,
should not be enlarged, and should either be encouraged to decay or to be removed. That a particular non-conforming use may be compatible, or
may afford some desirable service or amenity is afforded little weight.
3. The introduction into a district of a dissimilar
use either by special use permit or amendment to the
zoning map contravenes the "ideal" of "symmetry
of the same" and constitutes illegal "spot zoning",
which in a number of states is presumed when symmetry is compromised.
Although Euclidian zoning is the model envisioned
in enabling legislation, it is not the ideal of increasing numbers of professional planners and
students of urban order. More and more modern
land-use-planning thought asserts that the key to
harmonious, functional, and responsive urban and
suburban environments is planning that emphasizes
the unity of the community, the interrelationship of
qualitatively different land uses, and the need for
imaginative and creative design and arrangement of

(Continued on page 17)
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and the need for

imaginative and creative design
and arrangement of structures. "
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The tragedy of the commons develops in this way.
Picture a pasture open to all It is to be expected that
each herdsman try to keep as many cattle as possible on
the commons. Such an arrangement may work
reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal
wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both
men and beast well below the carrying capacity of the
land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that
is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability
becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the
commons remorselessly generates tragedy.
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to
maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less
consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding
one snore animal to my herd-"... The rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to
pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And
another; and another.... But this is the conclusion
reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a
commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked
into a system that compels him to increase his herd
without limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing
his own best interest in a society that believes in the
freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings
ruin to all

realizing that it represents a "natural resource",
worthy of, and demanding, protection. This
represents more than a mere exercise in semantics.
Our characterization of the land upon which we live
carries with it important legal consequences. It is
this changing trend and its legal ramifications which
are the subjects of this writing.
If indeed land is a resource then it represents
something in which the entire public has an interest.
Government regulations of land use then becomes
constitutionally permissible, because the protection
of exhaustible natural resources is a valid exercise
of the police power of the state.' More than fifteen
years ago a federal judge noted "[W]e cannot close
our eyes to the manifold illustrations of experience,
where man's over-exploitation has sharply
diminished or even extinguished the supply of
natural resources, wild game, and fish. 2
It has been said that "the need for effective environmental land-use regulation is at least as great
as the need for ordinary zoning regulations."' This
attitude is so prevalent among students and
practitioners in the planning field that it might be
called an empirical "truth" rather than a postulate.
The logic and arguments for the environmental
necessity of land-use planning and the legal

LAND DEVELOPMENTA Right Or A Privilege?
— James Murray

Surprisingly, this allegorical archetype is not the
futuristic rumination of Buckminister Fuller or Constantine Doxiadis but rather it is one segment of a
series of lectures on "The Checks of Population"
delivered at Oxford University in 1833 by one W. F.
Lloyd. Yet, despite the deligent and prophetic work
by the precursors of our modern urban planners, it
has only been in very recent history that the general
public has become aware of the importance of
managing land use.
The trend of contemporary thinking in the study of
land use is fairly simple to describe. We are ceasing
to view land as a "commodity" and are now
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ramifications involved will be partially cataloged
here.
Classifying land as a "resource" and thus
bringing it within the penumbra of the state's police
power is only the first step in attacking a number of
legal problems inherent in any state control of land
use. A number of these problems have been solved,
in part, by the new Virginia Constitution.
Article XI of the revised Constitution of Virginia
requires that all state government action be taken
with explicit consideration of the environmental consequences. Any effect this article will have on landuse management in the State must be limited to

confined realistically to lands in government ownership, but must take into account whatever lands are included in particular ecosystems, regardless of who
holds title to them. This broadening of the policy context may be opposed by persons committed to the
involaterghfp ndowershi, ld
specific interests in land use that they believe might be
threatened by public action.... But if the management of
whole ecosystems becomes a matter of public policy,
then the formulation of public policy must proceed
upon the basis of the proposition that all land is in
some degree public. The metes and bounds of
ecosystems ore determined by physical, biological,
and cultural forces. Men may impose their own
arrangements on natural systems, but engineers, surveyors, and lawyers neither amend or repeal the socalled lows of nature.°

those land-use activities with environmental consequences. The planners' response to this maxim
would be that every land use activity has important
environmental consequences. However this principle
has seen little legal recognition. In fact, only in the
case of power plant sitings have courts been
generally cognizant of the serious environmental impact of a land-use decision. This does not preclude
arguments that other land-use decisions have important environmental ramifications. It does,
however, restrict the environmental lawyer to nonlegal, but extensive, technical evidence.
The Division of State Planning and Community Affairs, in its report on Critical Environmental Areas, 5
seland-upigsenvromtal
necessity. They note that by the year 2000 (when the
state's population will have doubled) we will need a
300 percent increase in recreational areas. "A
single development decision of sufficient magnitude
in even a rural area can do extensive harm to an environmentally critical area. If state park land is not
acquired or planned for soon it will no longer be

The principal impediment to government control of
land use and development is the most basic of
American socioeconomic tenets—the free enterprise
system. The English companies formed to colonize
America were primarily real estate consortiums
organized for speculative purposes, and they
initiated a uniquely American tradition of treating
land as a commodity. Prior to the Revolutionary

Reston, Virginia — A Planned Unit Development
available. The selected critical environmental areas
[established by the study] are generally privately
owned properties with inadequate protection against
adverse development."
The environmental importance of land use
management is usually viewed as so pervasive in the
fight to save our environment that extensive government control over the field is seen as inevitable. One
environmental policy commentator has written that:
...[A]n ecosystems approach [to land-use planning]
may ultimately become necessary to human well being
and even to survival...The discourse can no longer be

War the colonies were under a "socage" system of
land tenure which recognized an underlying state interest in all lands within the jusrisdiction. However,
the United States Constitution eliminated this system
in favor of a system of "alloidal" tenure in fee simple. This decision has been termed a "most fateful
and potentially tragic development" for 20th Century land management problems and has been said
to have "conferred on the individual owner a virtually unrestricted right of use and abuse, limited in
practice only by the legal doctrine of nuisance, the
tenuous application of the police power. and the

power of taxation." This system is now firmly imbeded in the psyche of every American. No rights
are more sacred than "property rights." "Subordination of concern over the environment to private
property rights was accentuated by the ideas of such
men as John Locke, who were deeply concerned
with individual property rights, and reasoned that
there would always be enough land and water for
future generations."'
It is important to understand both this historical
background of the American approach to land as a
"commodity" and the economic motivation of those
who would perpetuate it. In many instances the
courts will balance the equities involved when a landowner argues that the use of his land is being unduly restricted. The environmental lawyer would be
wise to compare the ecological consequences of
particular uses and their broad effects for society
with the economic motivation of the landowner°
Local economics is the basis of all regular
American zoning decisions. But, even economists
recognize the futility of a purely profit-oriented approach to exploitation of resources, including land:
"[T]he system is finite. It cannot last because, for
one thing, it fails to calculate in its earnings formulas the ultimate capital expenditure: the earth itself. We are rapidly running out of natural resources."'°
Thus, any legal activity involving land-use planning must be undertaken with consideration of this
basic conflict between American free enterprise
economics and the newly-recognized environmental
detriments to the public generally. Social scientists
have little difficulty in determining where the
balance should be struck: "If our cities are to
remain liveable, they will need parks and open
space and in most cases in much greater quantity
6

than at present. Surely the public health rights of
hundreds of thousands of city dwellers are at least
equal to the speculative money-making rights of
individual or, increasingly, corporate landowners."
The traditional, preeminent American view of land
as an economic commodity with salability at the
root of all land-use regultion finds support in the
Constitution: no citizen of the United States may be
deprived of property by his government without just
compensation. This right is guaranteed by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as by most
state constitutions. It is the primary point of conflict
in the vast majority of land-use cases. Deprivation of
use or use potential by the government reduces
market value and, it is argued, amounts to "taking"
of property. "To be effective, environmental law
must come to grips with [this] basic tenet of the
American way of life...An individual is free to
utilize, change, or destroy his possessions insofar as
his actions do not seriously affect some other
person; natural resources are meant to be used, i.e.
consumed; there is no land form or physiography
which is prima facie non-developable." 12
Zoning is recognized as an exercise of the police
power of the state for the purpose of promoting "the
health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the
community" and encouraging "the most appropriate
use of the land". Courts will not invalidate
zoning
ordinance simply because it diminishes the value of
a landowner's property. The problems arise when a
zoning or other land-use ordinance seriously
restricts the permissable uses an owner may make of
his property; for any major restriction which substantially deprives the owner of "all beneficial use
and enjoyment" is usually classified as a constitutionally-prohibited "taking". However, this doctrine is limited by an exception which allows virtually unlimited regulation of land use if there is a
substantial "public safety" interest involved. For
example, flood plain ordinances are often allowed
to virtually sterilize a citizen's land, prohibiting any
beneficial use on grounds that constructive use of the
land would amount to maintenance of a public
nuisance.
Another restriction imposed on land-use
regulation under the compensation argument is the
"public benefit theory". The essence of this restriction is that a zoning regulation which is enacted
solely for the benefit of the public, but which
severely restricts the uses to which a private landowner may put his land, should give rise to an obligation on the part of the public to pay the landowner for the benefit it receives. This situation arises
when the only uses permitted the landowner are of a
"public character", in which case "the courts
sometimes seem to suspect the government of using
the police power to create parks and wildlife sanc-

a

tuaries without paying for them."
Whenever a land-use regulation is held confiscatory with respect to a particular parcel of land
the state may then determine whether the protection
of that property from a particular type of development is important enough to warrant some limited or
complete acquisition of the fee. One alternative use
of the police power, using eminent domain to control land use, is of limited effectiveness because the
cost of any extensive program is prohibitive.
A less expensive and particularly useful alternative to acquisition of the fee is state purchase of
an open-space easement in the property. Another, is
state purchase of "development rights" from the landowner. Several states provide for such practices
with the usual procedure providing that the owner
retain all ownership rights subject to a very restricted right of development in return for a tax advantage, usually a tax freeze at current rates or
value. Virginia's Constitution specifically allows for
state acquisition of such interests and it provides for
tax incentives through tax assessment of property according to its actual use. The chief fault with the
easement or development right approach is that in
order to be effective such an interest may often have
to so restrict the owner's development rights that the
property's market value is drastically reduced for
the near future. The result is that the fair market

value of the easement may be very close to the cost
of purchasing the fee.
Non-legal commentators hove gone so far as to
argue that development rights are privileges granted
by government acquiesence and therefore are freely
alienable by government action. They contend that
land ownership should be treated like any other investment. Thus it is subject to diminution in value by
government action, such as down-zoning, just as investment in the stack market is subject to the
vicissitudes of a government controlled economy.1 3
Afactormnlyvekdbthoswi
economic interests opposed to land-use control is
that the net long-term effect on the land investor
may be beneficial. As space becomes scarce through
the continued geometric expansion of population,
the value of open space and potential park and
recreation lands will grow proportionately. Land
which is zoned to insure its character as open space
and which carries a low annual property tax rate, as
envisioned by many proposals, will be exceptionally
valuable. "This recognition of new purposes for
regulating land should not and does not mean that
the old concerns with land's value and salability
should be ignored. On the contrary, the longerrange view expressed in the new land regulatory
systems will enhance land values over the long run
to a far greater degree than systems motivated
(Continued on page 13)
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THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT

"LAND GRAB"
— Leslie A. Hoffmann

The theories behind requiring land/fee exactions
for municipal facilities as a condition precedent to
subdividing are based upon the assumption that the
municipality is "allowing" the subdivider to sell his
land as lots and he therefore must compensate for
any additional burdens his activity places upon
public facilities. The question here does not concern
the desirability of these improvements, but rather
concerns who shall pay for them. The legal issue to
be explored is to what extent is it reasonable for a
subdivider to be required under the guise of police
power regulation to dedicate a portion of his
property to public use and at what point does this
amount to confiscation of property in contravention
of 5th amendment rights? There are several
subissues to be pondered: To what extent, if any, are
the rationales behind land dedications valid? Must
the burden of improvements cast upon the developer
be specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity or can he be required to confer substantial
benefits upon the public without receiving just compensation? Since in actuality the developer passes
on as much of these additional costs as possible to
his purchasers, does requiring these new residents to
"pay their own way" into the community
discriminate' against persons who can not pay the
cost of admission? Does this have an exclusionary
impact based upon income resulting in concomitant
racial exclusion? Do not these exactions result in a
disproportionate burden upon new subdivision
residents in contravention of the equal protection
clause which requires fair and equal treatment
among all persons similarly situated? Are not these
exactions a form of revenue raising and should not
they be treated as a tax and not as a police power
regulation?

8

PURPOSES OF LAND EXACTIONS
According to the Census bureau, the U.S.
population increased by 50 million in the last 30
years and is projected to increase another 50
million in the next 30 years. In addition, since 1950
the U.S. has experienced great urban expansion in
the fringe areas around our cities and this
population movement is expected to continue at an
even faster rate in the future) These two factors have
burdened many municipal budgets to the point of
financial crises in the effort to meet increasing
demands with inadequate economic resources. Local
governments have been engaged in a continual
struggle to provide expanding suburbs with
adequate schools, roads, recreational and municipal
facilities. Unfortunately, population growth and expansion has proceeded more rapidly than planning,
and cities have been caught with inadequate funds.
In addition, it seems inevitable that demand will
always exceed supply, and spending will always
keep pace with revenues so that there will never be
sufficient tax money to meet all current and long
term obligations. Since subdivisions represent a
potential drain on many aspects of the municipal
budget (additional recreational space, police and
fire protection, and school facilities), many
municipalities have sought to minimize the economic
impact of the influx of new people into the community by requiring subdividers to bear the costs of
parks, schools, and other municipal facilities. These
costs are in addition to improvements within the subdivision itself such as interior streets, sewers, etc. In
Pa. Coal v. Mahon (260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)
Justice Holmes warned; "We are in danger of
forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving

the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for change". Have we ignored or
forgotten this admonition?
THE RATIONALES BEHIND REGULATION
Not infrequently, when a subdivider approaches
the local planning commission to seek approval of
his plat, he is asked to dedicate a portion of his
ground for arterial streets, playgrounds, schools,
and other public facilities. If he refuses, his plot will
not be approved. In many cases this practice of
requiring land dedication as a condition precedent
to plat approval can look suspiciously like a veiled
unconstitutional exercise of the power of eminent
domain; yet, none of the cases to date squarely face
the question of why an uncompensated taking for
public use is unconstitutional in all areas except that
of subdivision controls. 2 Rather, courts have relied
upon a number of rationales. Two such overlapping
theories are the "voluntary" and "privilege"
theories. The reasoning is as follows: because there
is no right to subdivide, and the state need not permit it, exactions can be imposed. Thus, theoretically,
the owner "voluntarily" dedicates land to the
municipality for the "privilege" of having his plat
recorded. Two problems exist in these theories. First,
since plat approval is generally statutorily required
before the sale of lots commences, can it
realistically be said that land dedications are voluntary? Secondly, recordation is a method of enforcement to insure the orderly planned growth of
undeveloped areas. As such, recordation is merely a
statutory grant of authority by which the
municipality supervises land transfers and is not a
source of power or privilege in and of itself.
The second rationalization generally used to
justify the taking of property without the due-process
requirement of just compensation is the state's police
power. The thrust of this theory is that subdivision
control is like any other land use "regulation" which
can constitutionally impose limitations upon the use
of property. A word of caution: even though it is
easy to relate any type of subdivision control
"regulation" to the public health, safety and
welfare, this does not mean that constitutional
guarantees of due process and just compensation for
property taken for public use may be ignored.
Traditionally, the police power authorizes the state
to prohibit only "uses" of property that are harmful
to the public; it does not authorize the confiscation
of property simply because it is useful to the public.
The distinction between "taking" & "regulation" is
outlined by Nichols in his treatise on Eminent
Domain: "The distinguishing characteristic between
eminent domain and the police power is that the former involves the taking of property because of its

need for the public use while the latter involves the
regulation of such property to prevent the use
thereof in a manner that is detrimental to the public
interest." 3 "It is universally conceded that when land
or other property is actually taken from the owner
and put to public use by the public authorities, the
constitutional obligation to make just compensation
arises, however much the use to which the property
is put may enhance the public health, morals, and
safety." 4 Since land dedication requires the
developer to deed the land to the local government
for public use and benefit, it is difficult to understand how this action can be justified under the
state's police power when it constitutes a blatant
taking of land in contravention of 5th Amendment
guarantees.
Today, zoning ordinances and official map
requirements give the community effective control
over the layout and design of proposed subdivisions
which was the original purpose for required plat
recordation and subdivision control regulations.
However, municipalities under the guise of subdivision control seek not only to control subdivision
design but also to shift the burden of needed
municipal improvements upon the individual subdivider through a system of positive exactions which
go for beyond the negative prohibitions which are
the normal exercises of the police power. On this
basis some authorities argue that exactions are a
form of taxation. 5 These authorities maintain that
exactions, in no real sense, regulate subdivisions in
the interest of public health, safety and welfare, but
rather represent municipal efforts to shift the burden
of providing necessary public improvements upon
the new subdivision homeowners. Thus, they claim
that this is a tax problem and should be treated as
such.
(Continued on page 15)

Many land dedication ordinances are
deliberately made unreasonably severe in order to discourage residential development.
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Beauty and the Police Power
— Everett

One facet of zoning law is particularly irritating
to me because of its lack of vision. More and more
citizens are beginning to insist upon improvement of
the quality of their environment, including demands
that their communities be made more pleasing to the
eye. Many people are concerned about the growing
number of unplanned "shopping center rows," and
monotonously designed residential developments.
Yet, despite this desire for attractive surroundings,
until recently there has been no statutory or
decisional law bases for considering aesthetics in
the development of our communities. The standards
remain inadequately defined.
Assuming, therefore, that most citizens would
welcome imaginative, attractive, and well-planned
structures and other improvements, aesthetic sanctions are needed to effect this goal. Aesthetic zoning
is not the complete answer. In fact, since it has
never really been tried on a large scale without
reliance on other aspects of the police power, it may
not be the answer at all. Aesthetic control, and
especially site plan reviews by a board of architects
and other qualified persons, is a fine alternative and
one worth experimentation. It will not make all
shopping centers works of art or all subdivisions architectural marvels, but it might go a long way
toward eliminating the real eyesores.
THE EVOLUTION OF AESTHETIC CONTROLS
Zoning has its roots in the common law action of
nuisance. Our professor Anderson has given the
short hand definition of nuisance as "a pig in a
parlor instead of the barnyard." The development of
this area of the law allowed the later conclusion that
the rights of property owners were not absolute and
could be limited if found to be in contravention of
the public health, safety or welfare. Out of this concept grew the proposal that the police power of the
community could be utilized to affect orderly
development. The proponents of this concept
brought their efforts to a head in 1926 with the
carefully chosen test case of Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365. The success of
this effort is attested to by the naming of that system
10
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of comprehensive planning Euclidian zoning. The
concept soon achieved widespread use. By the end
of 1930 zoning ordiances were effective in 67% of
the urban population. Today just about every city or
county has some type of comprehensive zoning plan.
Zoning has had reasonable success in accomplishing its original goals, despite some
chequered areas such as zoning boards on the take
and the over-generous allowance of variances and
exceptions. The drastic effects which are possible
where the zoning board is irresponsible are demonstrated by Fairfax County where the board was
found guilty of accepting bribes.
The other branch of the development of aesthetic
control originated in the billboard battle which started in the 1890's. The first judicial reaction to the efforts to curb or control billboards was a firm rebuff.

In City of Passaic v. Patterson

the court reasoned

that "aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury

and indulgence rather than of necessity and it is
necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the
police power." This type of decision was reversed as
early as 1911 when a Missouri court held a
billboard regulation valid. The grounds given were
not aesthetics, which was the true reason, but rather
a string of arguments grounded in the police power.
The signs were found to "endanger the public
health, promote immorality, constitute hiding places
and retreats for criminals and all classes of
miscreants ....they are constantly used as privies and
for the lowest forms of prostitution." Gratuitously
and with a certain caution, the court also mentioned
that billboards are inartistic and unsightly.
BEAUTIFUL AS WELL AS HEALTHY
There have been many later decisions which have
credited aesthetic values, but never as the sole basis
for regulation. An economic basis invariably was
found. Important examples of the beauty which
could be preserved and developed even with this
requirement are the carefully regulated areas in
Williamsburg, Santa Fe, New Orleans and Nantucket. But the next big impetus in the progress
toward pure aesthetic regulation came in an eminent

aesthetic considerations alone may warrant an exercise of the police power." With these and other
cases the trend has come very close to an allowance
of police power based on the sense of sight..
Virginia law is not in this vanguard. Kenyon Peck
Inc. is Kennedy, 168 S.E.2d 117 (1969), 'reiterated
that a municipality or county cannot limit or restrict
the use which a person may make of his property
under the guise of its police power where ... justified
solely on aesthetic considerations. There was,
however, an unreported case in Fairfax County
where prohibition of high rise apartments was
allowed because a scenic view would have been
blaffectuatealready existing houses_
DEFINING AESTHETIC CONTROLS
- THE ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON
domain case, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954). This case involved the constitutionality of a
District of Columbia renewal program. The
statement may have been dictum, but it has been
cited so widely that it has had considerably more
weight than mere dictum. The Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, stated that "It
is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled." This language has been
quoted, almost without exception, in all succeeding
efforts to use state or municipal police power to effectuate control of the beauty of a community.
Since Berman a few isolated cases have
validated ordinances based almost exclusively on
aesthetics, but there has been no stampede. In State
ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. is Wieland, 69
N.W.2d 217 (1955), the Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld an ordinance requiring approval by a
Building Board before any structure could be built.
The exterior architectural appeal could not be at
great variance with other structures in the area.
Once again aesthetic values were coupled with
property values. The important and familiar case of
People is Stover, 191 N. E. 2d 272 came in 1963.
Here protesting taxpayers had hung rags, old
uniforms and underwear in their front yard. The City
of Rye, New York passed an ordinance prohibiting
the erection of clotheslines which blocked driver
vision—a conventional police power function. The
court went beyond this standard on its own initiative
and approved the statute on an aesthetic basis.
However, it still threw in the protection of real estate
values to support its holding. In 1965 Oregon City
is Hartke, 400 P.2d 255 cited Stover in sustaining a
total ban on wrecking yards from the city. In so
holding they stated that "We join the view that

In his hornbook on Urban Planning in § 48,
Hagman states that aesthetic control is one which attempts to preserve or improve the beauty of an area
as perceived by the sense of sight. To this he immediately adds the caveat that no one has to look,
but odors and sounds are difficult not to notice. In
that phrase is capsulized the history of aesthetic
zoning. Because it has always been rationalized that
one can avoid looking at ugliness, it has invariably
been left out of the potent forces of police power.
The other major stumbling block which has
traditionally been laid in front of controls for beauty
sake is that of vagueness. Public health, safety and
morals submit to reasonable definition, it is said, but
aesthetic considerations vary greatly with the wide
variations of taste and culture. Since no precise defnition can be given, all such ordinances are doomed
to be vague and incapable of enforcement without
arbitrariness. However, when you examine the other
branches of the police power, which have been
legitimized, you find imprecision which is far
greater than that in aesthetic controls. for example,
what is obscene? What can a government ban as offensive to public sensibilities? A movie like Deep
Throat may be temporarily cut from the screens of
New York and Williamsburg, but how long will the
courts allow such a ban to continue? How long will
Roth remain the obscenity standard? There are a
great number of imprecise areas in the law. When
the courts agree that conditions have changed, and
that aesthetics should assume their rightful plate in
the police power, we will probably be able to live
with the imprecision involved.
After the initially hostile reaction to aesthetic controls, the court system softened It position to the
point where beauty could be a consideration, as
long •as controls were mainly based on other areas
of the police power. Except in the few recent cases,
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this remains the basic policy of the law today. The
policy was summed up by Roscoe Pound: "Beauty
may not be queen, but she is not an outcast beyond
the pale of protection or respect. She may at least
shelter herself under the wing of safety, morality or

decency."
Are we not in a position finally to give beauty a
rightful place? Aren't we wealthy enough that every
dollar doesn't have to pay its own way. Can't the
desire to maximize profits be tempered by the need
to have structures approved before they are built.
This is not to say that the tastes of a few should be
imposed on the rest. But with model legislation, and
legislative guidelines, a board of knowledgeable
people reviewing site plans could constitute just
enough coercion to make builders build with the
public in mind. Edmund Burke once wrote: "To make
us love our country, our country ought to be made
lovely." Perhaps he didn't refer to aesthetic zoning,
but he does give the gist of the need for such standards. Our surroundings have a profound effect on
our daily productivity and the fulfillment of our
potentials. Perhaps court resistance to aesthetic control is a factor in urban blight, high crime rates and
the ugliness in much of the present development. To
have a respect and love for his community, a person
must be able to appreciate the beauty of his surroundings as well as its profit potential. If there is no
pride in the community, then the scruples about harming it are lessened. In the classic article Zoning
20 Law
For Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal,
and Contemporary Problems 218 (1955), J.J.
Dukeminier, Jr. put it this way, "Our communities
need to achieve an environment that is emotionally
satisfactory, that effects a reduction in purposeless
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nervous and physical tensions of the inhabitants.
When the inner life of an individual is out of
balance, anxiety occurs, expressing itself in a number of socially destructive ways."
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, TECHNIQUES,
AND THE OUTLOOK
Zoning is under attack. The newest front of the
civil rights movement is fighting the effects of exclusionary. Euclidian zoning, with its separate areas
for more desirable residences, has had the effect of
stratifying communities along economic lines. Urban
sprawl can be traced at least in part to the present
concepts of zoning. In California zoning is being
used to exclude commune from suburbia. Areas are
reserved for single family dwellings and the term
family is being redefined to exclude the communal
family. In another article in this issue, the use and
constitutionality of cluster zoning is examined. This
concept rejects the traditional method of blocking
off entire developments in lots without provision for
common areas. With cluster zoning houses and
apartments are being placed closer together, with
large areas of undeveloped land reserved as commons for recreation and natural maintenance. The
idea of allowing families to isolate themselves on
the biggest lot they can afford is losing favor. Instead of sideyards that are good only for mowing,
high priced land is now being preserved for the type
of mental expansion that is impossible in the typical
subdivision.
Historical areas are being preserved under
various systems. Williamsburg represents the most

(Continued on page 19)
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primarily by a desire to increase immediate
salability."
From a legal standpoint, the situation is in a state
of flux. Obviously, there will be some recognition of
environmental consequences in future planning
decisions. This is precisely what is required by the
new Virginia Constitution. However it remains to be
seen how far toward the courts will allow the pendulum to swing toward total state control over all land
use.
Land-use planning has been called "the base of
the pyramid for environmental control." Indeed, a
new awareness shared by an increasing number of
environmentalists makes increased government control over land-use inevitable. There is little doubt that
the consensus of expert opinion favors state-wide
planning controls and views such measures as the
trend. 5
In this context Virginia's Land Use Task Force has
said: "The existing policies of land use in the Commonwealth are grossly inadequate to fulfill the
State's constitutional mandate for assuring a quality
environment. The Task Force has concluded that the
Commonwealth needs an explicit state-wide land
use policy with appropriate instruments to execute
that policy." 16
The Council of State Governments lists numerous
problems which are factors in generating a need for
an increased state role in land resource
management. Such problems include rapid, uncoordinated, piecemeal and excessive land development; lack of adequate provision for future land-use
needs of agriculture, forestry, and industry;
inadequate protection of water supplies, wildlife,

and unique or historical areas; the need for "new
town" development; and inadequate local planning
and zoning."
The problem with this approach, besides the opposition of land speculators with vested economic interests, is that the states have traditionally viewed
"land-use control as an urban problem". However,
it is becoming apparent that "local zoning is
inadequate to cope with problems that are statewide or region-wide in scope, [and this] has fueled
the quiet revolution in land-use control." 18
Russell Train, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality writes: "[A]s our society has
become more complex it has become clear that
some land use determinations of one locality often
have important consequences for citizens in other
areas. It is in these issues of greater than local
significance in which state and regional involvement
seems appropriate, even necessary, if the broader
community affected by such decisions is to have
some influence over them.""
The popular press reflects the some attitude; a

recent article in the Wall Street Journal noted that
states are beginning to take back some of the land
use regulating authority from local bodies:
Fragmented control simply can't cope with today's
problems of protecting the environment, minimizing
the chaos of urban sprawl and providing adequate
space for housing and industry that increasingly sweep
across city and county boundaries. It's clear that states
are beginning to rethink their policies for the first time
in nearly half a century. And, as a result, a growing
number of planners, land use experts, and government

officials agree: The era for total local dominption in
the field is over....The problems of providing enough
land for housing, recreation, conservation, and industrial and commercial development can no longer be
solved by individual municipalities....[Property taxes

ore] a major stumbling block to state wide land controls....lf they compel communities to shore tax burdens, the court decisions would go a long way toward
relieving the pressure on municipalities to compete for
new development, thus making statewide land - use laws
easier. State officials are far more willing to consider
environmental values and the impact that a project
may have...than are municipal officials."

A state-wide plan of land-use control would
alleviate many complaints about local myopia
caused by greed and economic discrimination. Any
such plan would necessarily be arbitrary in nature
but it would be far less vulnerable to criticism of
being discriminatory against particular landowners.
In the numerous rural counties of Virginia where
land values are more consistent county-wide, and
long range development controls would have less
immediate drastic economic impact, this is particularly true. A more difficult situation is presented
in the highly urbanized areas where undeveloped
real estate is a rare "commodity". Here, treating
such land as a "resource" worthy of protection by
the state would subject the state to claims of "taking
without just compensation" and eventual state purchase would probably be necessary.
The Virginia Constitution creates no obligation for
the General Assembly to act, in contrast to the
Revision Commission's proposal and the environmental provisions of a number of state constitutions. 2 ' Thus any such legislation that the Assembly might pass would probably be the result of
pressure from environmentalists, The State Division
of Planning and Community Affairs, and the federal
government. In the latter case the impetus would be
considerable if proposed land-use legislation is
passed by Congress. Proposed legislation would
create economic sanctions for those states which do
not have a conforming state-wide land-use plan and
regulatory authority. The passage of federal
legislation which will require states to implement
state-wide land-use planning controls seems virtually
inevitable, particularly considering the support the
Administration-Jackson Bill received in the 92nd.
Congress. 22
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The existence of Virginia's Constitution, Article XI,
and the establishment of the environmental necessity
of planning does not in itself assure Virginians of
ecologically sound land-use planning any more than
would the creation of a state-wide planning
authority. The problem of implementation remains.
Justice Musmanno of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has written: -"[O]ne's bread is more important than landscape or than clear skies. Without
smoke, Pittsburgh would have remained a very
pretty village." 23 Likewise, many people of similar
persuasion, who honestly feel that they harbor a
justifiable concern for the economy of their own
locale and who candidly harbor a deep concern for
their own economic welfare, have managed to
neutralize some of the best efforts of environmentally conscious lawyers to see that the spirit
of legislation such as the Virginia Wetlands Act and
the proposed state-wide planning ordinances is
respected, and that the policy enunciated in article
XI is observed in the doily operations of government.
"[Land use] law is often politically enunciated
and politically enforced. The substance of the statute
is enacted in response to political pressures, enforcement is placed in the hands of executive branch
officials whose main concern is the political impact
of their actions, and it is all too infrequent that
political desires coincide with technologically and
socially effective solutions." 24 One glaring example
of how strong, well motivated, environmentally conscious legislation can be rendered toothless and environmentally destructive can be found in the Tahoe
Regional Planning Compact, a multi-state planning
agreement that was hailed as the savior of the
ecologically critical, and only marginally stable,
Lake Tahoe Region. The compact is a shambles now
that its implementation has begun and this is largely
due to the fact that the members of the Regional
Planning Agency, who were supposed to take a
longer and broader view than the existing local
planning entitles, are in large majority the same tunnel-visioned local business representatives that had
endangered the ecological balance of the region in
the first instance. The citizens of the area, led by the
League to Save Lake Tahoe, are now desperately
seeking a way to halt the planning authority, which
they hailed only 14 months before, because it appears destined to perpetuate and guarantee the
ruination of a beautiful wilderness area. 25
Over one hundred years ago Federick Low
Olmstead, who was America's first landscape architect
and city planner, as well as the designer of New
York's Central Park, foresaw the urban blight indigenous to unrestricted metropolitan sprawl and
fought to have the city not only reflect the needs of
commerce but of "humanity, religion, art, science
14

and scholarship. Long before the end of the
Nineteenth Century he foresaw the choked, crowded
Manhattan we now see, the need for green, grassy
suburbs, the interdependence of adjoining urban
regions, and the threat to the air itself. When asked
to build Prospect Park in Brooklyn--his finest park-he tried to lift the eyes of the politicians to a
regional system of parks and roads running from the
Atlantic Ocean to the Hudson Valley. But they kept
their eyes to the ground; 'Practicality' triumphed,
and we are left today with the debris of that practicality. 26
It is Olmstead's sort of approach to land use that
has now been universally accepted by scientists,
scholars, and even lawyers as not only environmentally attractive but as critical to the future
of the world. It remains, however, for the legislature
and the courts to adapt the legal system to reflect
this same recognition. §
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PRACTICAL EFFECT OF LAND DEDICATIONS
Generally speaking, the public shifts the burden
of the needed improvements upon the purchaser. But
to consider the effect upon the homeowner there
must be a distinction drawn between the different
types of improvements charged to the purchaser. The
on-site improvements such as streets, curbs,
sidewalks, gutters, etc. have caused few problems.
These improvements benefit solely the property
within the subdivision and the need is caused directly by the subdivider's activity. The cost when passed
on to the home buyer is not unreasonable because
expenses for these improvements could be directly
charged to the property owner by a special
assessment. But, serious questions are presented
where municipalities predicate plat approval upon
the meeting of conditions which require the
developer to construct facilities which exceed the
needs of his development (which constitute a windfall to other property owners) or require him to
dedicate land for general municipal facilities such
as schools.
Municipalities justify such requirements by
rationalizing that the population increase which is
responsible for these needed facilities is attributable
to the builder's activity and, therefore, he should be
made to bear the burden of his own profit-making
venture. There are two fallacies in this
rationalization. The first is that the builder is responsible for the community's growth. Population expansion is due to (1) the geometric growth of
population and (2) the location and desirability of
the community itself. The builder merely seeks to
meet an already existing demand. Thus, realizing
that the demand is directly related to the normal

.

overzealous officials try

to

exact

as

much as possible without regard to the
developers' rights or the effect upon new
residents."

growth of the community itself, it is difficult to justify
exactions which benefit the public at large when the
subdivision residents constitute only a portion of the
population influx into the community and only a portion of the public benefiting from such improvement.
When the subdivider is forced to subsidize the
public, one of two results occur, both of which result
in increased consumer costs. First, if the developer is
forced to absorb the additional burden, he will have
little incentive to engage in this high risk activity
again. As the supply of lots decreases, newcomers
will be forced to pay higher prices for available lots
and homes or seek older housing elsewhere.
Second, if the developer shifts the costs to the purchaser, the new owner will be forced to pay a
higher price for his land. In either case, the effect of
land exactions is to stem the tide of population
migration by indirectly slowing growth by closing
off the supply of housing or by increasing costs.
Either way, the municipalities can effectively place
the cost of single family dwelling beyond the reach
of many Americans. Thus, in reality, exactions
require new persons to pay the price of admission
into an existing community by way of public improvement fees. This practice has an exclusionary effect upon those who con not afford the price. In Appeal of Kitmar Builders, 268 A. 2d 765 {1970), the
court held that municipalities may not refuse to confront population growth by adopting regulations
which effectively restrict population. The court
-admonished the town to provide the services which
traditionally had been the municipality's responsibility to furnish. Where many land dedication ordinances are deliberately made unreasonably severe
in order to discourage residential development 5
this decision is equally applicable.
Query: Are new homeowners really paying their
own way or more? While new residents pay for their
share of the municipal facilities in their neighborhoods, they are not relieved from property taxes
used to meet the obligation of previous municipal
bonds which pay for the facilities in the existing
parts of town. Secondly, other new residents who do
not live in subdivisions, such as buyers of existing
village lots, townhouses, and condominiums and
apartment dwellers all utilize and burden public
facilities, but pay no like fee. Therefore subdivision
,
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homeowners carry a disproportionate burden of
municipal expenses. To quote New York Supreme
Court Justice Van Voorhis in his dissent to Jenad,
Inc. v. City of Scarsdale 218 N.E. 2d 673, 677,
(1966), "There must be apportionment of tax burdens either among all property owners of the state,
or the local division, or the property owners
specifically benefited by the improvements...lf one is
required to pay more than his share and he receives
no corresponding benefit from the excess, ... that
may properly be styled extortion or confiscation. A
tax or assessment upon property arbitrarily imposed
without reference to some systems of just apportionment can not be upheld." Thus, to burden
only subdivision homeowners with indirect exactions
for provide community facilities is discriminatory
and in contravention of equal protection which
requires fair and equal treatment among those
similarly situated,
Ronda Realty Co. v. Lawton,
111 N.E. 2d 310 (1953).
PRACTICAL NEED TO COMPLY
Unfortunately, discrimination against outsiders is
far from academic because many fast growing
suburbs seek to prevent migration by making it
economically onerous to enter a community. The
problem remains as to what is being done, and the
answer to that question is basically: nothing! The
reason for this inaction is that exactions are seldom
challenged because of the practical need to comply
with the municipality's requirements. The average
builder is under considerable pressure to move as
quickly as possible to get his job done. Consequently, if the city conditions the approval of his
plat with an exaction costing him $12,000 plus lost
profits, he has 3 alternatives: (1) to hold the land until the city buys or condemns it, (2) "voluntarily"
dedicate the land and lose $12,000 in plus profits,
or (3)litigate the issue of the city's power to impose
the condition or the reasonableness of the condition.
Typically, the subdivider chooses the second alternative because he depends upon rapid turnover of
his capital to survive. No builder can (profitably) afford the two or three years necessary to litigate the
constitutionality of the condition(s). Subdividers who
are faced with the fiscal problems of paying both
taxes and interest on borrowed capital on unimproved prime development land plus meeting
overhead expenses and contract obligations with
general contractors, subcontractors and
materialmen, can not afford to wait for justice to
take its course. In addition subdividers fear incurring
the of the city which could result in the use of
harassment techniques such as rezoning or difficulties in securing building or occupancy permits.
If the builder wants to subdivide in the city again he
must submit to the exactions!
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The high cost of litigation is not only due to the
stiff price of waiting but also includes the high cost
of assembling the comprehensive proof necessary to
prove the unreasonableness of the exactions. The
strong presumption of constitutionality afforded the
state, as well as the traditional judicial deference
given to government, makes the burden of proof difficult to meet.
Because builders are reluctant to take
municipalities to court to test the reasonableness of
conditions imposed, it appears that the latter are in
on extremely powerful position. Knowing that
developers rely upon speed to keep operating and
that any attempt on their part to resist fees or
dedication results in lengthly and costly delays,
overzealous officials try to exact as much as
possible without regard to the developers' rights or
the effect upon new residents. Surprisingly, some officials negotiate dedications even if they are not
given this power by statute or ordinance.' In addition, many existing ordinances which purportedly
give certain powers in this area are not even constitutional. 9 Concessions can vary from contributing
$100,000 for a new school to requiring deeds that
restrict the size of the homes to a size larger than
required by ordinance.° Thus the door is wide open
to arbitrary discrimination and abuse. This danger is
even more likely where officials are members of the
'local population who would rather make new
residents bear more than their fair share than to
have to bear the cost themselves. Therefore,
statutory standards and enabling legislation which
would require municipalities to comply with
statutory mandates would be one step towards
restraining the unlimited coercive power presently at
the finger tips of local authorities. Policing of these
communities should be done by the state as well as
making challenge by the private sector more
feasible. Statutes should allow the developer to
reserve the land required for dedication, but allow
him to proceed with his development until the
reasonableness of such exaction is judicially determined. Thirdly, the states should secure planning on
regional levels to insure the co-operation and coordination of communities and to insure orderly
area growth rather than permitting innumerable
groups, each seeking to serve only its own interest,
to adversely affect area development by disregarding the general welfare of the region. Lastly, on the
local level, cities should develop overall plaons for
the location of municipal facilities. They should
budget funds and secure passage of bonds for the
purchase of undeveloped land before it becomes
prime development land purchased by the
developer, for orderly planning will secure orderly
growth without having to resort to unconstitutional
means of financing it. §

2

Implications of Changing Metropolitan
Areas, Planning (1958).
Subdivision Exactions: Where Is The Limit?,
42

3
4
5

Notre Dame Lawyer 400, 403 (1967).
Nichols, Eminent Domain, 87 (1964).
Id. at 90-91.
Heyman and Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Im-

1 Hauser,

posing Increased Community Costs on New Subur73
ban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions,
Yale L.J. 1119 (1964).

Fagin, Regulating the Timing of Urban Development 20 Law and Contemporary Problems 298, (1955).
7 Hanna, Subdivisions: Conditions Imposed by Local
Government 6 Santa Clara Lawyer 172, 191 (1966).
8 Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling
1961
Community Growth On the Urban Fringe,
Wis. L Rev. 370, 386.
6

9
10

Id. at 389.
Id. at 392.

REASSESSMENT

(from page 3)
structures. The well planned community, under this
approach, is not necessarily one in which like uses
are first aggregated and then separated from different uses, but is instead one in which the uses permitted are so arranged and ordered that the
dynamics of the urban system can function at the
highest level consistent with the public welfare. The
key to effectiveness under this approach is not symmetry and division, but performance and unity.
Utilizing this key, it may well be possible for the
planner, who sees the urban system as a dynamic interrelated process fed by change rather than as a
static order, to envision a workable, non-Euclidian
plan for a particular community. He may develop a
practical design for a partially developed area
predicated upon uniqueness, not uniformity, in which
"non-conforming uses" may be enlarged and blended into the whole, and in which additional uses of
a qualitatively different nature which afford needed
amenities aesthetically compatible. But the legal
climate in which most planners must function, heated
by a Euclidian sun and made humid by uniformity, is
too stifling for this kind of productive endeavor.
A number of studies have concluded that Euclidian
zoning, with its static concepts, just does not work in
areas where development pressures are strong. Increasingly, development occurs not under zoning,
but by amendments to zoning ordinances and maps.
Non-Euclidian planners-zoners, recognizing the
need for flexible response capability in implementation oordinances in recent years, have introduced the concepts of "planned unit development", "residential planned communities", the
listing of multitudes of uses permitted only by administrative discretion governed by a standard such
as "hold zoning" "contract zoning", the "floating
zone", and "performance zoning". While these
more flexible implementation techniques afford advantages lacking in a purely Euclidian approach,
they are, in the minds of many, incompatible with

the assumption that zoning should be in accordance
with a comprehensive plan with mop appended.
Although judicial acceptance of these techniques is
increasing, it remains nonetheless true that their
legal underpinnings are insecure.
In summary on the point, I do not suggest that the
Euclidian be outlawed, only that the non-Euclidian
be more effectively accommodated by the legal
system. This can be accomplished by eliminating
from zoning enabling legislation requirements that
regulations be uniform and expressly authorizing the
use of performance standards and flexible
techniques to guide, encourage and control land
development and use.
The second premise underlying current land use
planning enabling legislation is that the formulation
and implementation of land use policies belongs entirely at the local level of government. With few exceptions, states have delegated the police power
over land use to the localities without retaining or
reserving power or procedural tools to protect the
state interest from adverse local planning and implementation activity. Just as local planning and implementation proceeds from an awareness that the
common weal can be served by subjecting individual
tracts to land use controls, it would seem that state
planning would assume that the interests of the state
as a whole may require the developmental patterns
of localities to be subjected to state influence and involvement. In England and several European countries, local planning is required to serve not only
local needs, but broader needs as well. This is not
so in the United States, with the possible emerging
exceptions of Vermont, California and Florida.
Does a state need a ready capability to direct, influence and control local planning activity and the
development undertaken pursuant thereto? Several
examples, which I hope will constitute a sufficient
answer, follow:
1. When all of the suitable farm and grazing land
in a state is already put to agricultural uses, and the
state's population is rapidly expanding, can it wisely
permit to localities the determination of whether
such land is to remain as part of the agricultural
economy or be developed into subdivisions?
2. When a substantial segment of a state's
population can afford housing no better than mobile
homes, can a state wisely leave to localities the
determination of whether mobile home parks are a
permitted use in a community?
3. When there is a substantial unemployment in a
region of the state that could be significantly
ameliorated by the location of a prospective major
industry in a particular locality, can the state wisely
leave to the locality the determination of whether or
not the industry is welcome?
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4. In a region of the state where water resources
for human consumption and industrial use are
scarce, may the state wisely permit individual
localities, through their land use plans, to determine
the allocation which actual development under such
plans will assure?
The list could be expanded. The point is that local
land use plans reflect local values and perceptions
of self-interest and may not reflect the broader
needs of the state and region.
In a number of states a beginning awareness of
the state interest in local land use practices is
evident, as witnessed by the various wetlands
statutes, coastal plains land use control codes, and,
in Virginia, the undertaking of studies to identify
"area of critical environmental concern". What is
needed, however, is a candid acknowledgement to
the effect that on a broader scale, land use practices
in the localities are of sufficient potential
significance to the general welfare of the state as to
justify direct state involvement at the local level of
planning and implementation.
Such involvement could take a number of forms,
one of which might be expressly affording the state
standing to enjoin developmental activity believed to
be injurious to state or regional interests. The
proposed oil refinery and industrial complex
proposed for Nansemond, Virginia, of concern to
the people of Norfolk, Newport News, Virginia
Beach and Portsmouth, is an example of a situation
to which a state response would probably be appropriate. Other approaches could involve requiring
local land use plans and implementation ordinances
to be submitted to an appropriate state agency for
review and comment before adoption and amendment, requiring that they be in conformity with a
state-wide land use plan, which would in effect be
implemented through control and coordination of
local plans.
In the context of this problem, one must keep in
mind that any question involving relationships between the state and its localities, or their respective
areas of jurisdiction, is essentially a political
question which must find its resolution in the
political arena. When the issue is state control over
land use, the political question is highly controversial, if not explosive. Nonetheless, it needs to
be resolved in the interest of the whole, not the
parts.
The third principle which I would question is the
principle that land is the target towards which land
use planning enabling legislation is aimed, and that
as a consequence, traditional concepts of property
rights, real property rights, limit the regulation and
control of land uses. The emphasis on land has
clouded the vision of the public, the courts, and the
practioners in the planning field with unnecessary
18

distortion and impairment. I submit that the true subject of regulation in land use planning and implementation is not land, but activity, and that a
zone which permits a specific land use is, in reality,
conferring s license to engage in that activity. If the
orientation of the legal basis of land use planning
related to the issue of the reasonableness of the
licensing requirements and procedures applicable to
the acitvities beinng regulated, rather than to the
reasonableness of the "land controls", the air would
be clearer and planning could occur in a better
legal climate, with the requirement of
"reasonableness" still being maintained. In substance, I believe land use planning to be primarily a
process which attempts to allocate and coordinate,
within a spatial context, the activities that are to be
carried on in the community, and to promote
physical harmony by the imposition of design
criteria related to height, bulk, and open space.
Land is entirely secondary. It is activity with which
the planner and the community are primarily concerned.
Two statements illustrate the point I wish to make.
Both statements are credible and have a wide
following. The first is: A man should not be
The
deprived of his property without compensation.
second is A contemplated activity genuinely and

materially affecting the public interest is a proper
subject of regulation. Suppose that the legal issue is
whether the developer of a proposed shopping center adjacent to a major artery can be legally
required to construct and maintain a parallel artery
to accommodate the traffic problem which his
development would create. The Courts are divided in
their response to the issue, some regarding the
question as essentially a property matter, to be
resolved in the context of traditional notions of
property rights, while others recognize the question
as essentially one in which the issue is the
reasonableness of a condition attached to the licensing of an activity. I subscribe to the latter view, and
believe that government may properly regard
development as an activity, which, in a spatial as
well as a broader context, can be subjected to
reasonable licensing requirements.
In summary and conclusion, I believe that the fundamental legal underpinnings of state land use planning enabling legislation require examination and
modification if land use planning and implementation is to be effective. The shortcomings of
the Euclidian concept, the negligence of state noninvolvement, and the limitations of, the misplaced
emphasis on land, as opposed to activity, as the
critical subject of concern must be remedied. Attention to these problems has not been lacking.
Responsible critiques and suggestions for improvement of the state of the art and practice of

land use planning and control techniques abound in
current literature in the field. Perhaps the most
noteworthy attack on the inadequacy of state
enabling legislation is the undertaking of the
American Law Institute to develop a model act,
which in tentative draft is known as "A Model Land
Development Code". The project, begun in 1963,
may produce o final draft in 1974. Although the
language of the tentative draft is just that, tentative,
I would note that the draft abandons Euclidian terminology, recognizes a broader state role in the formulation and implementation of local land use
plans, and regards developmental activity, rather
than land as the subject of planning and implementation. Among other things, the draft seeks to
improve administration, authorizes localities to offer
development incentives, permits condemnation for
purposes of encouraging development, expressly
authorizes the imposition of land dedication
requirements and of fees to defray public expenses
that may need to be incurred in response to development, and provides a system for making public land
use decisions affecting individual parcels public
records that may readily be examined in a "title"
search. The Code, when adopted and published in
final form by the American Law Institute, is certain
to have a major impact on the reformation of
enabling legislation across the county—certainly a
delightful prospect. §
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extensive and probably the most successful effort.
The National Trust and other societies are working
to catalogue important structures so they won't be
demolished. New York City has an innovative
program which lists landmarks and prohibits their
destruction or changes without prior approval. This
has been suggested to be an unjustified interference
with property rights. An alternative could be the purchase of negative easements against the destruction
of historic areas. Robert L Montague III in an article at 51 Va. L Rev. 1214 (1965) suggests a system
of tax incentives to be used in Virginia for the
preservation of its many antiquities. Even with these
efforts to catalogue and preserve, the loss of important landmarks continues. Under a program
inaugurated in the 1930's the Historic American
Buildings Survey listed more than 10,000 buildings
worthy of preservation. It was estimated in 1963
that 50% of these buildings, significant in America's
history and culture hod already been destroyed.
Another unfortunate development is demonstrated
by Seagram & Sons v. Tax Commission,
200
N.E.2d 447 (1964). The Seagram building in New
York City had been built with unusual core and the
result was a beautiful structure that promoted the
economic interests of the owner and enhanced the
beauty of the city. The Tax Commission chose to
adopt a different appraisal system which increased
the owners tax bill. This was an obviously selfdefeating and short-sighted action, but it was affirmed.

CONCLUSION

The most attractive method for enhancing the appearance of our communities is the adoption of architectural boards of review. These have been rejected in several cases, but the time is ripe for their acceptance. Whatever the method adopted, aesthetic
control is a vital field and one worth the efforts of
the legal profession. The wealth and know-how are
available. The question remains whether the courts
and the legislatures will provide the legal framework
for protecting the beauty of our communities. The
alternative is for our generation to be remembered
only as the innovators of "shopping center row."
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made available from endowment as an
impetus to the drive on the assumption
that an equal amount will be raised from
fifty percent of the membership of the
Law School Association.
Wayne O'Bryan of Richmond,
President of the Law School Association,
is chairman of this the School's first annual alumni fund drive. Over ninety
volunteers are contributing time and
energy to the effort. Professional
guidance and staffing is being provided
by William and Mary's Office of College
Development.
Contributions should be made payable
to "William and Mary - Law School" and
mailed to Marshall-Wythe School of Law
Fund, Box EH, Williamsburg, Virginia
23185.
Third-year law students of MarshallWythe have initiated a fund-raising effort
among members of that class.
Each graduating student is being
asked by class volunteers to pledge his
financial support of the School for three
years following completion of his degree.
According to Tom Wright, who is coordinating the effort among students, his
twelve volunteer workers pledged over
$1,000 during their one-hour
organizational meeting.
The effort among students was formally kicked-off at a cocktail party
hosted by the Law School Association for
third-year students, spouses, and fiancees. Wright reports that as of May 1
$6,530 had been pledged, topping the
class goal of $5,000. §

Alumni
CLASS OF 1929
JUDGE AND MRS. WALTER E. HOFFMAN have moved to a new residence.
The address is .5737 Shenandoah Avenue,
Norfolk, Va. 23509. Judge Hoffman was
elected to the Federal Judicial Center
Board last year for a four year term.

CLASS OF 1938
The town of Colonial Beach, Va.
recently honored GEORGE MASON, JR.
with a plaque commemorating thirty-four
years of faithful service as Town Attorney.

CLASS OF 1948
W. GARLAND CLARKE, of the firm of
Clarke & Johnston in Lively, Va., is
presently serving as Chairman of Lan-
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caster County Board of Public Welfare
and President of Region II of the
Episcopal Diocese of Virginia.

Mason was appointed Substitute Judge of
the Courts Not of Record for the City of
Newport News early in 1972.

CLASS OF 19.50

CLASS OF 1963

STANLEY H. MERVIS is presently
Associate Patent Counsel for the Polaroid
Corporation. His address is 11 Nod Hill
Road, Newton Highlands, Mass. 02161.
Fort Worth, Texas claims the residence
of JOSEPH P. PARKER, a member of the
firm of Sears, Parker, Quisenberry and
Spurlock. Mr. Parker is active in the
labor law section of the Texas State Bar
and his family lives at 3608 Wayland
Drive in Fort Worth, zip code 76133.

THOMAS O'C. MOYLES has recently
moved to 515 S. England St., Williamsburg, Va. 23185.
WILLIAM M. WHITTEN, Ill's new address is 2748 Black Forest Drive, St.
Louis, Missouri 63129.

CLASS OF 1951
While looking forward to an upcoming business and pleasure trip to
Spain, RICHARD W. WITHINGTON is
serving his community as Attorney for the
Point Pleasant, N.J., Board of Health. The
Ocean County Bar Association recently
honored him with a plaque in recognition
of dedicated service to the Bar.

CLASS OF 1956
FLORIAN BARTOSIC, Professor of
Law at Wayne State University, was a
Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Michigan for the summer of 1972.
Mr. Bartosic authored articles dealing
with labor law which were published by
the University of Chicago Law Review
and the Cornell Law Review during 1972.

CLASS OF 1957

CLASS OF 1964
E. KENDALL STOCK of the firm of
Schantz, Stock, Marshall and Walma of
McLean and Leesburg, Va. is serving as
Chairman of the Virginia State Bar Insurance Committee.

CLASS OF 1965
C. LACEY COMPTON, JR. Woodbridge, Va. is presently Chairman of the
Prince William Board of Directors of the
Bank of Virginia - Potomac, and is also
Vice President of Potomac Hospital.
STANLEY C. SHERWOOD and his
wife, the former Lynn Halsey of Williamsburg, have moved to their new address:
Suite 225, 4700 Biscayne Blvd., Miami,
Florida 33137. Mr. Sherwood is Vice
President and Counsel, Greater Miami
Title Services, Inc. He attended the
Florida Land Title Association's Convention in Nassau last fall.
NICHOLAS J. ST. GEORGE is presently Vice President in Charge of Investment Banking for Legg Mason & Co.

CLASS OF 1966
JOSEPH M. MAURIZI attended the
Notional health and Welfare Conference
in San Francisco this past November. He
is a member of the firm of Balzarini,
Walsh, Conway, and Maurizi in Pittsburgh. Mr. Maurizi is also active in the
Academy of Trial Lawyers of Pennsylvania, and attended the Academy's
convention in Rome, Italy in 1971.

CLASS OF 1960
Attorney general Richard G. Kliendienst, who is also President of the
Federal Bar Association, has appointed
HARMON D. MAXSON as Chairman of
the FBA's Indian Law Committee. While
on vacation recently, Mr. and Mrs. Maxson visited thirty-five Indian Reservations
and attended such festivities as tribal
dances and a rooster pull.

CLASS OF 1962
has
SHANNON T. MASON, JR.
recently formed a partnership with
William Ferguson under the firm name of
Ferguson and Mason. The address is 225
28th Street, Newport News, Va. Mr.

GUS J. JAMES, Ill became a partner
in the firm of Kaufman, Oberndorfer, and
Spainhour of Norfolk, Va. in early 1972.
He is presently President-Elect of the
Young Lawyers' Section of the NorfolkPortsmouth Bar Association

CLASS OF 1967
ROGER L AMOLE's address has been
changed to 201 N. Washington Street,
P.O. Box 1138, Alexandria, Va. 22313.
Mr. Amole is a member of the Executive
Committee of the Alexandria Bar
Association, a member of the Board of
Directors of Alexandria's YMCA, and a
member of the Board of Directors of the
Little River Village Community Counsel.
In December of 1972 BURKE
MARGULIES accepted a position with the
Virginia Notional Bank as its Trust Officer. Mr. Margulies lives in Norfolk.

CLASS OF 1968
JOSEPH T. BUXTON, III was oppointed in November of 1972 Associate,
General Counsel, Newport News Ship

Building and Dry Dock, Ca He has also
been elected Secretary of the Nuclear
Service and Construction Co., Inc., a subsidiary of NNSBDDC.
JAMES A. EVANS and his wife, the former Jeanne S. Felhofer, have moved to
their new home at 521 Turtle Cove Road,
Virginia Beach, Va. Mr. Evans is with the
firm of Underwood, Byrd, Dinsmore, and
Evans, ltd. In October of 1972 he attended the International Conference of
Shopping Centers in Tampa, Fla.
JAMES C. PATTESON's new address is
4608 Bromley Lone, Richmond, Va.
23226. He is now Virginia Sales
Representative for Matthew Bender &Co., Inc., a legal and tax book publisher.
Mr. Patteson is presently on the Presidential Search Committee for Richard Bland
College of the College of William and
Mary.
THE WALTER A. SMITH's had their
second son, Michael Ingram, in May of
last year. Mr. Smith will continue
clerking for Walter H. Moorman, Judge
of the Circuit Court of Montgomery
County, Maryland until September 1973,
when he then plans on entering private
practice. He passed the Maryland State
Bar exam and was admitted to practice
lost December. He already is a member
of both the Virginia and the D.C. Bars.

CLASS OF 1969
The new office address for GRAYSON
G. FENTRISS is Suite 606, 700 Building,
Richmond. Virginia 23219.
GLENN J. SEDAM, JR.'s new address
is 907 Leigh Mill Road, Great Falls,
Virginia 22066.
JOHN D. SOURS will join the firm of
Smith, Corrie and Hancock in Atlanta,
Georgia upon his separation from the
Office of the Judge Advocate General
(Army) in Washington this June. He was
selected for inclusion in the 1972 edition
of Outstanding Young Men of America.
1 Surfway No. 204, Monterey California 93940 is DAVID A. STEWART's new
and pleasant sounding address.

CLASS OF 1970
The marriage of DENNIS HENSLEY
and Adrienne Andriani of New York took
place December 30, 1972. Their Address
is 950 25th Street, NW, Washington,
D.C. 20037. Mr. Hensley was recently
named Assistant General Counsel of the
National Association of Securities
Dealers, Washington.
JOHN L. NORMAN, JR. is now living
at 924 25th Street, NW, Washington,
D.C. 20037. As of 1972 he has been a
Certified Public Accountant in Maryland.
He is also executive secretary of the

Washington Alumni Chapter of Phi Alpha
Delta Law Fraternity.
JAMES L. MCLEMORE, Ill has joined
the firm of Thomas L. Woodward (Sr. &Jr.) in Suffolk, Virginia. The McLemores
new address is 122 Franklin Street, Suffolk. The newly married couple
honeymooned in England, Scotland and
France last October.
WILLIAM R. REGISTER has recently
moved from Juneau, Alaska to 1900
Jamestown Road, Alexandria, Va. 22308.
Recently assigned to the U.S. Army
Agency for Aviation Safety, JOHN J.
SABOURIN, JR. is now residing at 37
Kirby St., Fort Rucker, Alabama 36360.
The Sanbourins hod a son, Nicholas
John, born to them in October 1972.
Matthew Jordon Zwerdling was born
to the JEFFREY M. ZWERDLINGS on
December 5, 1972. Mr. Zwerdling has incorporated his practice, the address of
which is 4615 W. Broad Street, Suite
311, Richmond, Va. 23230

CLASS OF 1971
Since finishing his federal clerkship
last June, NICHOLAS J. DEROMA has
been employed as counsel with the IBM
Corporation. His new address is Consul
C-318 2400 Virginia Ave. NW,
Washington, D.C.
STANLEY M. HIRSCH has become
Assistant Commonweath's Attorney in
Chesapeake, Virginia.
FRED K. MORRISON has been
promoted to Major in the U.S. Army. His
new address is Quarters 2437-A, Fort
Lewis, Washington 98433. He was selected for inclusion in the 1972 edition of
Outstanding Young Men of America.
Having completed his clerkship with
Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of
Va., MICHAEL E. KRIS has become an
associate with the D.C. law firm of Danzonsky, Dickey, Tydings, Quint and Gordon. His new address is 6669 McLean
Drive, McLean, Vo. 22101.
FREDERICK L. SHREVES, II has recently joined the staff of the Office of
General Counsel — Federal- Maritime
Commission in Washington, D.C. His
new address is 11906 Duke of Bedford
Court, Reston, Va. 22091.
THOMAS S. REAVELY is presently a
law clerk for Justice David Harris of the
Iowa Supreme Court, having already served a stint as legal counsel for the Iowa
State Senate during the 1972 legislature.
His new address is 404 S. Chestnut, Jefferson, Iowa 50129.
LOUIS S. SHUNTICH, presently a
member of the New Jersey Bar, has been
accepted to the Graduate Division of
New York University School of Law to
complete an LL.M. in taxation.

CLASS OF 1972
CHARLES R. ASHMAN has become a
partner in what is now the firm of Duffy,
Dengenhordt and Ashman in Savannah,
Georgia. He hos also been appointed
Assistant District Attorney for the Eastern
Judicial Circuit of Georgia, Chatham
County, Recording Court, Criminal
Division. His address is 130 E. 52nd
Street, Savannah, Ga. 31405.
Admitted to the California Bar in
December 1972, DENNIS BECK is
presently Deputy District Attorney in
Fresno. The Becks had o baby boy.
Craig, last November. Their address is
3222 E. Dakota No. 144, Fresno, California 93726.
WILLARD (BILL) BERGMAN of
Morristown, N.J., and the former Jennifer
Leigh were married on August 26, 1972.
Bill was admitted to the N.J. Bar lost
November and is now on associate with
the firm of Schenck, Price, Smith and
King in Morristown.
PETE DESLER is presently a Captain in
the Judge Advocate General's Corps
(Army) and is working in the Litigation
Division at the Pentagon. His address is
No. 609 Seminary Towers East 4701
Kenmore Avenue, Alexandria, Va.
Employed with the Public Defender
Association of Philadelphia, Pa. is
EARLES D. LEES, JR. The Lees became the
parents of Earle David Lees, III on
August 25, 1972. Their new address is
601 E. Wishort St., Philadelphia, Pa.
19134.
Elsie M. POWELL'S new address is
7358 Shenandoah Ave., Annandale, Va.
22003. She is currently employed as
Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney in
Alexandria, Va.
ROBERT R. KAPLAN is now an
associate of the Richmond firm of
Heischler and Fleischler. His address is
11721 Wiesinger Lone, Midlothian, Va.
23113.
Admitted to the Pennsylvania Bar last
fall, ROBERT L. MARKS has been appointed Law Clerk to Judge Jay W.
Myers, Judge of the 26th Judicial District,
Columbia-Montour County. Bob is also
associated with the firm of Wagner and
Marks and his address is 132 West
Market Street, Danville, Pa. 17821.
MR. AND MRS. WILLIAM M. MUSSER,
III became the parents of William M.
Musser, IV on July 27, 1972.
JOHN A. SCANELLI'S new address is
795 Hampshire Lane, Apt. 201, Va.
Beach, Va. 23462. He is associated with
the firm of Kaufman, Oberndorfer and
Spainhour in Norfolk.
WILSON F. SKINNER, JR. is now
associated with the Williamsburg firm of
Corneal, Smith and Athey. He has moved
to 409 Filmore Drive in Williamsburg.
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